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ABSTRACT  
   
The landscape of science education is changing. Scientific research and the 
academy are both becoming increasingly complex, competitive, interdisciplinary, and 
international. Many federal research agencies, scientific professional societies, and 
science educators seem to agree on the importance of strong ethics education to help 
young scientists navigate this increasingly craggy terrain. But, what actually should be 
done? When it comes to teaching ethics to future scientists, is the apparent current 
emphasis on basic responsible conduct of research (RCR) sufficient, or should moral 
theory also be taught in science ethics education? In this thesis I try engage this question 
by focusing on an existing, related debate on whether moral theory should be part of 
teaching professional ethics more generally. After delving into the respective approaches 
promoted by the three primary participants in this debate (C. E. Harris, Bernard Gert, and 
Michael Davis) I unpack their views in order to ascertain their practical application 
potential and relative benefits. I then take these findings and apply them to ethics 
education in science, paying particular attention to its purported learning objectives. In 
the end I conclude that the presentation of these objectives suggests that moral theory 
may well be required in order for these objectives of ethics education in science to be 
fully achieved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Current talk of ethics in science focuses on responsible conduct of research (RCR). Both 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Academy of Science declare 
RCR to be an essential part of the formation of future scientists (“Chapter IV”; 
Committee) and the NSF and National Institutes of Health have formal requirements for 
RCR training in education (“Responsible”; “Update”). Preliminary investigation into 
major research university websites would seem to indicate that the majority of this sort of 
training is limited to one credit-hour seminars or online tutorials
1
. However, the ongoing 
changes in science, education, and university culture all risk undermining the efficacy of 
these current ethics education practices (Hollander and Arenberg; Committee). Moreover, 
given some of the proposed expansions on the notion of “responsible conduct of 
research,” there is even more reason to question if this existing methodology is sufficient 
(see e.g. Hollander and Arenberg). In particular, there is a call to teaching students a 
deeper understanding of ethics (see e.g., Hollander and Arenberg 12-3, 18) as well as 
promote the deeper moral values that underpin science and ensure it serves the public 
trust (Committee).  
One possible way to answer this call to greater depth in ethics education in 
science would be to add moral theory to the ethics education curriculum. Since moral 
theories explicitly focus on the theoretical underpinnings of ethics and arguably offer a 
                                                 
1
 Although one hopes that RCR training is infused in the curriculum more generally as 
well. 
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richer understanding of morality and moral values, prima facie this seems like an ideal 
solution. However, whether it actually is ideal is an open question, and one we will 
pursue in this thesis. Since there is no noticeable debate on this exact question of moral 
theory in science, we will instead explore the question of moral theory in professional 
ethics more generally, and then apply it back to science. Since this concern of 
professional ethics more generally deals with professions like engineering – which has 
experienced a similar call to deeper ethics education (Hollander and Arenberg) – looking 
at it should hopefully shed light on the science question as well. 
In exploring this question, we will focus on one illuminating (and perhaps 
representative) debate between three scholars: C. E. Harris, Bernard Gert, and Michael 
Davis. First we will examine their respective views on the role of moral theory in 
professional ethics, paying particular attention to how they perceive moral theory and its 
advantages (or disadvantages) when it comes to teaching and practicing professional 
ethics. We will then look at how their respective approaches will likely play out in a 
professional ethics class setting when it comes to actually analyzing moral problems. 
This is a more practical exercise aimed at ascertaining what sort of ethics understanding 
students will probably garner from the experience. Next, we will compare some of the 
respective views’ features to see if there might be a reasonable consensus on what we 
should do when it comes to teaching ethics or moral theory in professional ethics. This 
includes examining not only the pedagogical goals of teaching ethics in professional 
ethics, but also some of the practical realities of the context of teaching ethics in 
professional ethics. Finally, we will bring it back to science, considering in particular 
what science students ought to get out of ethics education and what sort of approach 
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seems most likely to achieve these outcomes, as well as briefly considering some of the 
questions to be asked and pursued next. 
  4 
CHAPTER 2 
HARRIS 
 
Since this particular conversation about the appropriate place of moral theory in 
professional ethics begins with C. E. Harris, we will start there. Within this tripartite 
conversation, Harris is the only one who advocates using a traditional moral theory when 
teaching practical or professional ethics. In particular, he advocates using 
consequentialism (namely utilitarianism) and deontology (namely Kantian ethics, which 
he refers to as “RP theory” for “respect for persons”) (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 
51), because he believes that these two moral theories are at the level of moral reasoning 
that best fulfills what he takes to be the necessary functions of a moral theory. In Harris’ 
analysis, there are four basic levels of moral reasoning, each of which fulfills to a 
different degree the three key functions that a moral theory ought to perform. These four 
levels represent an ascending degree of this function fulfillment, with the level-four 
theories of utilitarianism and RP theory fulfilling these functions to the greatest degree. 
Furthermore, along with these level-four theories best exemplifying the necessary 
functions of a moral theory, they also offer five key advantages in practical application 
for professional ethics, one when the conclusions of utilitarianism and RP theory 
converge and four when these conclusions diverge. Ultimately, these advantages are why 
Harris believes that moral theory – especially utilitarianism and RP theory – is beneficial 
to both students and practitioners of professional ethics, and why he advocates their place 
in the classroom. 
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 According to Harris, there are four levels of moral reasoning. At the first level we 
have moral judgments that are made about specific acts or actions, where moral reasoning 
involves considering the action in a single case or situation – in isolation from other cases 
or situations – and then classifying that action as permissible, impermissible, obligatory, 
or supererogatory (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 53). There is a particular subset of 
this level of moral reasoning that involves making an implicit moral judgment about a 
specific act or action by means of descriptive evaluation (Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 53). In these instances, the description of the action in a case or situation is such 
that it implies that the given action is wrong or impermissible, so in essence there is a 
hidden premise “action X is wrong” that reduces the description to being a moral 
judgment about a specific act. 
The second level of moral reasoning is more general than the first, and involves 
making moral judgments that apply to a range of related actions (Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 53). So at this level of moral reasoning we would consider an entire class of 
actions that can occur in cases or situations and then classify that entire class as 
“permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory” (Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 53). At the third level of moral reasoning we have what Harris refers to as 
“intermediate moral principles,” which includes things like D. Ross’ “prima facie duties” 
and Bernard Gert’s “moral rules” (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 53). Finally, the 
fourth level of moral reasoning is where we find “high-level moral principles, or moral 
standards” like those found with utilitarianism and RP theory (Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 53-4). 
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 By way of illustration: At level one, we would have something like the judgment: 
“Mark should not divulge information about his clients without their express permission.” 
At level one prime (the subset) we would have something like: “Mark’s actions are a 
form of exploitation!”, which has the implied premise “exploitation is wrong”, thereby 
reducing the previous statement to: “Mark’s actions are wrong.” At level two we would 
have something like: “Divulging information about his clients without their express 
permission is wrong,” which considers a general class of actions. At the third level we 
would consider things like Ross’ duties of fidelity (that there was a promise to not 
divulge client information) or non-maleficence (if said divulgence might cause client 
harm) or Gert’s moral rules like “keep your promise” or “do your duty” (if there is a 
professional duty to not divulge client information without express permission). At the 
fourth and final level, we would calculate the harm versus the benefits of Mark’s actions 
(for utilitarianism) or look to whether or not clients’ rights have been unduly violated or 
infringed (with RP theory). 
 Part of why Harris makes these various distinctions in terms of levels of moral 
reasoning has to do with the fact that he believes that what constitutes a moral theory is 
really just a matter of degree (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 56). According to Harris, there 
are three key functions – unitive, insight, and rational – that a moral theory ought to be 
able to perform; how well a theory performs each of these functions is indicative of its 
degree of being a moral theory. The degree of a moral theory’s unitive function depends 
on how well it is able to take a large collection of moral judgments – ideally the whole of 
morality – and basically capture these many moral judgments with a single statement or 
idea. Theories that cannot capture the whole of moral judgments, or that require more 
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statements or ideas than just one, are less unitive than a theory that can capture all moral 
judgments in a single idea, and the more statements or ideas required to capture morality 
and/or the less of morality that is captured, the less unifying or “unitive” we consider to 
be a given moral theory.  
The degree of a moral theory’s insight function depends on how well or how 
much it can offer insight into morality itself, its nature, and its purpose. The more moral 
insight, the higher a theory’s function, and vice versa. Finally, the degree of a moral 
theory’s rational function depends on how truly useful or practical that theory is in terms 
of trying to analyze and resolve moral issues. The better a moral theory is at providing 
rational (or practical) suggestions when faced with moral issues or dilemmas, the higher 
the rational function, and vice versa. These three functions are supposed to map onto the 
basic functions of theories in any other disciplinary area, like science where evolutionary 
theory unifies a large grouping of biological phenomena (e.g. the genetic, developmental, 
and morphological diversity), offers insight into the nature of said phenomena, and 
provides rational suggestions for further scientific research (Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 56). With respect to ethics, then, a good moral theory should unify a large 
grouping (if not the entirety) of moral judgments, offer insight into the nature and 
purpose of moral judgments and morality itself, and provide a rational basis for dealing 
practically with moral issues we might come across. 
 Based on these three purported functions, we can see how from level one to level 
four there is an increase in the degree of moral theory function fulfillment. Since 
particular judgments like “Mark should not divulge information about his clients without 
their express permission” cover only that particular action, offer no significant insight 
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into the nature of morality more generally, and do not suggest more general guidelines 
for further moral reasoning, they fail to perform any of Harris’ three functions. More 
general judgments like “Divulging information about his clients without their express 
permission is wrong” perform the unitive function slightly because they do cover a class 
of actions, but this class of actions is still relatively small and their degree of specificity 
offers minimal insight into morality more generally or the resolution of moral issues 
beyond the given class of actions. Intermediate moral principles like Ross’ duties and 
Gert’s moral rules extend quite a bit further than the first two levels, and, when combined 
with “auxiliary concepts” like what rational impartial people would do, can arguably 
cover all of common morality and provide rational guidelines for tackling moral 
problems (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 57; also 55). However, while moral reasoning 
at the third level appears to fulfill all of the required functions of a moral theory (at least 
with these auxiliary concepts added), according to Harris theories at the fourth level like 
utilitarianism and RP theory ultimately satisfy the three required functions of moral 
theory even better (or to a higher degree) (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 57). 
 Harris recognizes that level-four theories like utilitarianism and RP theory 
struggle to entirely fulfill the required unitive function of a theory (“Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 57). In fact, because of the many controversies surrounding both theories (see 
e.g. Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 58-9), he ends up conceding that neither theory is 
adequate in accounting for all of common morality (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 57, 
59). This problem (which Harris refers to as “the Problem of Incomplete Extension” (“Is 
Moral Theory Useful” 59)) can elicit two main responses (Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 59-60). The first is to seek out a better theory, presumably one that does capture 
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all of common morality, which is what Gert suggests is the most natural response to this 
Problem (“The Usefulness” 26). 
 However, Harris rejects this proposal of adopting a sort of utilitarian Kantian 
principle (“A Reply” 46-7), and in fact declares the prospects of finding any better theory 
than utilitarianism or RP theory “dim” (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 59). The second 
response, which Harris prefers, is that this inability of any single moral theory to 
adequately capture all of common morality actually suggests that we have at least two 
separate, conflicting conceptual strains of morality that make up common morality itself, 
and these two conceptual strains are what basically lead us to utilitariainism and RP 
theory (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 59). Even though neither strain can encompass all of 
common morality (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 60), Harris claims that this should 
not be viewed as a problem (if anything, in practice Harris appears to treat it like a useful 
tool). Because of the Problem of Incomplete Extension, Harris thinks it is often 
particularly useful to analyze a given moral problem using both theories and then 
compare the results (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 60). If the results from both tests 
converge, then we are justified in having a high degree of confidence that the converged 
upon conclusion is correct or best (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 60). However, even 
if they diverge this analysis can still be quite useful (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 
61). 
 In particular, Harris sees several key benefits that can come about from using 
level-four theories like utilitarianism and RP theory, even when the results of analyzing a 
moral problem with both theories diverges. First, Harris maintains that “high-level moral 
theories” actually enhance our abilities in recognizing the nature and structure of some of 
  10 
the fundamental conflicts that occur in moral controversies (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 
62). In his reply to Bernard Gert, Harris illustrates three main “modes” of moral problems 
or controversies: an application problem, a conflict problem, and a RP/utilitarian 
problem. The first mode (application problem) is a problem about whether or not a 
particular morally charged term (like “bribe” or “extortion”) applies in a given situation 
(Harris “A Reply” 39). The source of the problem is that while “paradigmatic” 
applications of moral terms are often uncontroversial (such as Harris’ case of an engineer 
taking a large sum of money to promote a specific product), when dealing with “non-
paradigmatic” applications people can frequently disagree as to whether or not that moral 
term applies (such as Harris’ case where the engineer is now trying to import products 
abroad and needs to determine if the customs-demanded “fee” is a “bribe” or an 
“extortion” so he can decide whether or not paying the fee is permissible).  
The second mode (conflict problem) occurs when there is a conflict between two 
or more competing obligations or values and it is unclear what degree of importance or 
“weight” ought to be assigned to each of these values (Harris “A Reply” 40). The third 
mode (RP/utilitarian problem) is a specific kind of conflict problem: one that occurs 
between the two competing conceptual strains in terms of how we evaluate our moral 
options, whether by focusing on general utility or welfare or focusing on respecting the 
moral agency of individuals who are affected by a course of action (Harris “A Reply” 40-
1). Since this third mode represents many, if not most, of the kinds of moral conflict we 
tend to encounter, using both utilitarianism and RP theory in moral problem analysis is 
especially beneficial to our recognition and understanding of the fundamental nature of 
many conflicts and moral controversies. 
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 The second benefit of using high-level moral theories, which seems to me to 
almost be a species of the first, is that it helps us anticipate the nature and character of 
moral controversies before they even arise (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 62). I say it 
seems like a species of the first because recognizing the fundamental nature of utilitarian-
RP conflicts and anticipating that the likely character of moral conflicts is going to be 
utilitarian-RP appear highly intertwined (see e.g. Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 64). 
The third and fourth benefits are that knowing “high-level moral theories” provides us 
with a richer knowledge of the conceptual and technical underpinnings of moral analysis 
and, arguably a result of this richer knowledge, a greater ability to engage and critique 
opposing moral positions or beliefs (Harris “Response” 82; also Harris “Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 64-5). 
 In the end, Harris sees many reasons for using moral theories like utilitarianism 
and RP theory: not only do these theories represent the pinnacle of (available) levels of 
moral reasoning and, as a result, best fulfill the functions he argues a moral theory ought 
to fulfill – namely unify the majority of morality and our moral judgments, offer insight 
into the nature of morality and our moral judgments, and aid us in making rational moral 
decisions; they are also the most useful to people who do professional ethics in an effort 
to resolve moral problems in professional practice. When these problems occur, testing 
them with both utilitarianism and RP theory and reaching the same conclusions with each 
can provide us with a high degree of confidence in a chosen course of action. Moreover, 
even when this convergence does not happen, though, these tests are still the way to go. 
Ultimately, even in cases of divergence, Harris believes that students of 
professional ethics and professional practitioners can find both value and reassurance 
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from recognizing and understanding that the sort of conflicts that they come across in 
professional ethics, specifically those between promoting general welfare and respecting 
individual persons, are in fact the kind of conflicts that are entrenched in the very nature 
of morality itself. Because of this understanding they can have an increased awareness of 
how and why these conflicts play out in their own professional lives and in public 
debates, appreciate the richer insight that this understanding of moral theory provides into 
the underpinnings of the moral tests and moral reasoning used in professional ethics, and 
have as an advantage the ability to use these two theories to evaluate and critique the 
moral issues with which they are presented. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GERT 
 
Another advocate of using moral theory in teaching practical and professional ethics is 
Bernard Gert. The specific moral theory he advocates is his own, which he refers to as 
“common morality.” Common morality can be thought of as “Kant with consequences”, 
or “Ross with a theory” (Hare 27); it’s what Harris placed at the third level of moral 
reasoning (although we will discuss whether or not this distinction Harris makes seems 
truly warranted).  Gert’s common morality is an attempt at systematically unifying all – 
or at least the majority – of our commonly accepted moral beliefs and judgments into a 
set of rules and procedures we can follow to determine those cases in which we are 
justified in breaking one or more of the rules. Based on the idea of what rational, 
impartial, equally informed people would accept and promote, Gert devises ten basic 
moral rules and a two-step procedure for deciding appropriate rule-breaking scenarios, 
and also offers some guidance on the morally relevant features we should look at in 
making these determinations. 
While there are some challenges that can occur when utilizing this latter 
procedure – in particular with situations where rational moral disagreement is still 
possible even after perfect application – Gert maintains that his common morality is 
nonetheless best at fulfilling what he argues are the key functions of a moral theory, and 
moreover has particular advantages when it comes to dealing with irresolvable moral 
disagreements. Additionally, because this common morality comes from our common 
experience and is the sort of thing we by and large already accept, it has a sort of 
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intuitiveness that is advantageous when trying to have students and practitioners who use 
professional ethics learn the rules, their application, and their justified violation. This 
means that common morality not only is best at being a moral theory and helping deal 
with irresolvable moral disagreements, it is also eminently practical, which is why Gert 
concludes that it is the moral theory that belongs in the professional ethics classroom. 
Gert’s view is that insofar as we tend to believe that morality as a phenomenon is 
essentially universal, then we believe that there is in fact only one morality, and all 
competing moral theories or systems are really just variations of that universal morality 
(Gert “Morality” 8). So in this sense, common morality is a foundational moral theory, as 
opposed to utilitarianism and RP theory, which would be variations (or what Harris called 
“strains”). Along with being foundational, Gert says common morality is at least 
implicitly accepted or acknowledged by pretty much everyone, and in particular everyone 
doing professional ethics. Regardless of whether they realize it, anyone who is engaging 
in professional or practical ethics is making assumptions about a “systemic knowledge of 
morality” that grants their moral judgments some sort of rational basis (Gert “Morality” 
6). Now, it could be the case that this “systematic knowledge of morality” actually comes 
from some other moral theory like utilitarianism, RP theory, virtue ethics, etc. Or, at 
least, it is not clear why these would be excluded at this point in the argument. However, 
Gert maintains that when doing professional ethics and analyzing moral conflict in 
professional settings, people believe that their conclusion is precisely what most impartial 
and rational people with the same knowledge and understanding of the situation would 
reach, which is a core part of Gert’s common morality (“Morality” 6). 
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In its most condensed version, Gert’s common morality can essentially be thought 
of as a set of moral rules and acceptable violations as can be determined and publicly 
advocated by impartial, rational people. Gert’s exact rules are as follows:  
1. Don’t kill. (Don’t cause permanent loss of consciousness) 
2. Don’t cause pain. (This includes mental pain as well as physical pain.) 
3. Don’t disable. (Don’t cause loss of ability.) 
4. Don’t deprive of freedom (or opportunity). 
5. Don’t deprive of pleasure. 
6. Don’t deceive. 
7. Keep your promise. (Don’t break your promise.) 
8. Don’t cheat. 
9. Obey the law. (Don’t break the law.) 
10. Do your duty. (Don’t neglect your duty.) (“Morality” 13-4) 
These are supposed to be the rules that all moral agents (as rational persons) can know, 
understand, agree with, and act upon (Gert “Morality” 17; also Gert “The Usefulness” 
28).  
Once we know these rules, determining whether a potential violation of the rules 
should be allowed involves a two-step procedure that begins with identifying the morally 
relevant features. One possible way to identify the morally relevant features of a potential 
rule-violation situation would be to follow Gert’s list of ten questions: 
1. What moral rules are being violated? 
2. What harms are being 
a. avoided? 
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b. prevented? 
c. caused? 
3. What are the relevant desires of the people toward whom the rule is 
being violated? 
4. What are the relevant rational beliefs of the people toward whom the 
rule is being violated? 
5. Does one have a duty to violate moral rules with regard to the 
person(s), and is one in a unique or almost unique position in this 
regard? 
6. What goods are being promoted? 
7. Is an unjustified or weakly justified violation of a moral rule being 
prevented? 
8. Is an unjustified or weakly justified violation of a moral rule being 
punished? 
9. Is the situation sufficiently rare that no person is likely to plan or 
prepare for being in it? 
10. Is the violation being done intentionally, knowingly, voluntarily, 
freely, or negligently? (“Morality” 17-8) 
 While Gert presents these questions as the preferred method for discovering the morally 
relevant features, I imagine he would allow for other questions or procedures insofar as 
they would generate the same morally relevant features as does his list of questions. 
 The second step would then be to look to the effects that would occur if the rule-
violation in question were publicly allowed and determine whether or not an impartial 
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rational person would advocate the violation given the effects that are thought to follow. 
In making this determination, we need to consider the goods and harms involved, what 
kind they are, how serious they are, what their likely duration would be, and the 
probability of them actually occurring (Gert “Morality” 18). Additionally, when multiple 
people are affected, then we need to take into account the distribution of these goods and 
harms (Gert “Morality” 18). So, in the end, Gert’s common morality is a sort of Kantian-
ultilitarian moral theory: the ten determined rules are deontological, while the 
determination of whether breaking a rule is morally justified is consequentialist. 
Unfortunately, though, this second step – even when performed perfectly – cannot 
guarantee a consensus on what a rational impartial person would publicly allow; 
according to Gert, equally informed impartial rational people might still reasonably 
disagree on the relative ranking of the potential ill effects of allowing the violation 
(whether one type of harm is worse than another) or agree in rankings but still disagree as 
to how much harm they think would be likely to occur if the violation were publicly 
allowed (“Morality” 18-9). Either of these disagreements would lead to different 
conclusions about the morally correct action would be. 
 Even with this apparent deficiency in mind, given this basic understanding of 
Gert’s moral theory, it is not readily apparent why Harris is so opposed to granting this 
version of common morality level-four status. One can condense much of the theory and 
unify most of common morality under the (seemingly) single idea: morality consists in a 
set of rules and acceptable violations as can be determined and publicly advocated by 
impartial, rational persons (stated earlier in this section). Unpacking the rules and 
procedures for determining acceptable violations takes a bit more effort (but even here it 
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was a matter of a few pages, which hardly bespeaks of an arduous undertaking or 
apparent disunity). Moreover, utilitarianism’s idea of the greatest good for the greatest 
number and Kant’s Categorical Imperative require unpacking as well, so it seems a bit 
unfair to hold this fact against common morality but not utilitarianism and RP theory. 
Gert’s common morality also fulfills the insight function by explaining the nature and 
source of morality (what impartial rational people would agree upon), as well as the 
rational function by giving a systematic way to help resolve moral issues. As such, while 
Harris might have other good reasons for showing preference to utilitarianism and RP 
theory (Harris “A Reply”), that Gert’s common morality fails to be a moral theory to the 
same degree or level in terms of his stated functions does not seem reasonable. 
 Moreover, Gert seems to suggest a different set of functions for a moral theory, 
one that might push utilitarianism and RP theory down to a lower level than common 
morality. Over the course of discussing common morality and his comparison of it with 
Harris’ view, Gert brings up at least five key functions that a moral theory ought to 
fulfill
2
. First, Gert says any moral theory ought to explain – and indeed, if possible, justify 
– morality and any of its corresponding variations (“Morality” 8). Second, a moral theory 
ought to explain the different ways of categorizing the moral status of categories of an 
action, such as permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory (Gert 
“Morality” 9). Third, a moral theory ought to explain how morality relates to social 
practices and institutions, including professional roles (Gert “Morality” 9). Fourth, a 
moral theory ought to be able to fulfill its practical function of helping people in their 
                                                 
2
 I say at least five because these are the ones I picked up on, but since I could not find a 
single cohesive list there could well be more embedded in his writing elsewhere. 
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making of moral decisions and judgments, which includes making explicit the nature and 
interaction of the moral rules, ideals, and features that comprise morality (Gert “The 
Usefulness” 29). And finally, a moral theory ought to explain not only why there is 
widespread agreement on the answers to many moral questions, but also explain why 
there is apparent unresolvable moral disagreement over the answers to a not insignificant 
portion of controversial moral issues (Gert “The Usefulness” 31). 
 The first function is like Harris’ “insight function,” except that Gert makes it 
stronger by requiring (or at least recommending) justification for the moral theory. The 
fourth function is like Harris’ “rational function,” but again appears stronger by 
demanding a moral theory not simply “provide a useful and suggestive basis for moral 
analysis and for resolving moral issues” (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 56), but 
actually make a lot of the features and their interactions “explicit.” Gert does not appear 
to have a corollary to Harris’ “unitive function,” and indeed decries this function as being 
almost a sort of slogan worship (“The Usefulness” 26) (although Harris denies the latter 
claim (“A Reply”)). But this does leave Gert requiring or suggesting three functions that 
Harris apparently does not: explaining the different moral categorizations of actions, such 
as the difference between moral rules and moral ideals (which Gert does by use of the 
impartiality clause, “Morality” 19); explaining the relationship between morality and 
various aspects of society and social institutions and practices (on which Gert especially 
makes a point to separate common morality from religious and cultural tradition as well 
as describe professional duties (“Morality” 10, 15, 20-22; “The Usefulness” 32, 33, 35); 
and explaining the presence of unresolvable moral disagreements. 
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 Gert seems to present this last function – explaining the presence of why there are 
apparently unresolvable disagreements about many moral issues – as a key benefit of 
common morality with respect to professional ethics. According to Gert, “A valuable 
practical function of a moral theory is to remind people that when dealing with 
controversial matters there are sometimes legitimate unresolvable moral disagreements” 
(“The Usefulness” 31-2). Specific to professional ethics, Gert draws on his experience as 
a member of a hospital ethics committee, where he found “that fruitful moral discussion 
is far more likely to take place when everyone acknowledges that there is more than one 
morally acceptable solution to a controversial moral problem” (“The Usefulness” 31). On 
the surface at least, this seems counter to the common morality program; if common 
morality is supposed to capture all of morality, and is the sort of thing we all can (and 
indeed often do) agree with, how is it that we are able to end up with disagreements 
where resolution is impossible? 
 This happens, Gert says, because even when we all agree on the facts of a 
situation and its morally relevant features, there can be aspects to the analysis that are not 
really governed by the moral rules, or are subject to more subjective interpretation. First, 
rational, impartial, equally informed people can agree on the harms and benefits to a 
situation, but not agree in their relative rankings (Gert “The Usefulness” 33). Second, in 
cases where a situation can impact things that are not deemed moral agents – and hence 
not explicitly governed by the moral rules – rational, impartial, equally informed people 
can disagree on which of these things ought to still be protected, at least partially, but the 
moral rules, and to what extent (Gert “The Usefulness” 34). Third, rational, impartial, 
equally informed people can disagree on the overall balance of good and bad 
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consequences that will probably occur if a rule violation is publicly advocated versus 
publicly condemned (Gert “The Usefulness” 34). Finally, rational, impartial, equally 
informed people can disagree with the interpretation or scope of a moral rule, particularly 
when a potential violation is non-paradigmatic (Gert’s example involves whether hair-
coloring constitutes a violation of the anti-deception rule, “The Usefulness” 35). 
 Even acknowledging the existence of these different sources for moral 
disagreement, and granting that these sources might lead to irresolvable disagreement, 
Gert maintains that recognizing and accepting the rational existence of multiple 
acceptable solutions to moral problems is an asset to his view because it allows for 
people to compromise in the solution of a moral dilemma without sacrificing their own 
moral integrity (“The Usefulness” 31). Additionally, Gert believes that its overall 
intuitiveness and basis in common experience make common morality easy to both teach 
and practice, making it a more reliable guide for students and professionals seeking to 
determine the morally best course of action in a given situation (“The Usefulness” 36-7). 
 In the end, Gert believes we have good reasons for favoring his common morality 
over the alternatives: not only is it a fairly succinct, cohesive theory with ten basic moral 
rules and a two-step procedure for determining acceptable violates of the rules based on 
the idea of what rational, impartial, equally informed people can agree upon and promote, 
it is also to his mind the theory that best fulfills the necessary functions of a moral theory 
– namely explaining and justifying the moral theory; explaining the moral categorizations 
of particular actions; explaining the relationship between morality and various social 
institutions; provide practical ways for practitioners to make morally responsible 
decisions; and explain the presence of irresolvable moral disagreement. Moreover, this 
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ability to explain the presence of irresolvable moral disagreement, as well as its 
intuitiveness to and ability to be easily explained and used by everyday people that are in 
large part why Gert maintains that common morality is the best option when it comes to 
teaching students about professional ethics. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DAVIS 
 
Opposing both Harris and Gert in their support of using moral theory in teaching 
professional ethics – whether utilitarianism/RP theory or common morality – is Michael 
Davis. Davis states that he is not opposed to moral theory per se, and, in fact, thinks that 
in theory understanding moral theory can be helpful (“Professional Ethics”; see also 
Davis “The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 69). However, he believes 
that in practice moral theory is not particularly useful (or simply not useful at all) (Davis 
“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 69). Given the various constraints 
that exist in the context of teaching professional ethics in a course, he maintains that 
trying to teach moral theory is not the appropriate avenue.  
After differentiating some of the possible functions of a moral theory, Davis 
selects and expands on the function he believes is most relevant to teaching professional 
ethics – helping students in choosing the correct course of action. Davis also considers 
some of the important differences between moral theory generally and professional ethics 
specifically and combines knowledge of these differences with the primary objectives of 
teaching professional ethics to determine what he believes should be the goals of a course 
in professional ethics. Because of these goals and potential practical problems that may 
(or do) occur with trying to teach moral theory to professional ethics students, Davis 
concludes that moral theory is inappropriate in a professional ethics course. He also 
presents his own list of eight tests as a practical alternative to moral theory, which not 
only better fulfills his perceived objectives for a professional ethics course, but also has 
  24 
the advantages of decreasing: (a) student resistance to learning; (b) time needed to 
present the material; (c) time necessary to learn and apply the material; and (d) amount of 
necessary instructor expertise or training. In the end, it is largely the sheer practicality of 
Davis’ tests that he believes makes them ideal candidates for instruction in a professional 
ethics course, where moral theory is not only unnecessary, but perhaps even detrimental 
to student learning. 
 In considering Davis’ position, it is useful to understand how he differentiates the 
functions of moral theory in general and the goals of teaching professional ethics 
specifically. According to Davis, three (non-exclusive) functions of moral theory that 
ought to be distinguished are: First, a moral theory ought to provide us with some sort of 
understanding into the nature and purpose of morality. Second, a moral theory ought to 
help people determine which course of action available to them is morally correct. And 
third, a moral theory ought to empower people with the ability to defend their own course 
of action and convince others that their choice is morally correct, or the ability to criticize 
another’s choice and attempt to convince them that that choice is not morally appropriate 
and in need of revision (Davis “The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Teaching” 53).  
Specifically when it comes to teaching professional ethics, Davis says that the key 
concern is a version of the second function, specifically to help students determine which 
course of action available to them is morally correct in the context of their chosen 
profession (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Teaching” 53). In a later work 
(“Professional Ethics”), Davis presents what he views as the three objectives of teaching 
professional ethics, which I suspect he takes to be an expansion on this function of 
helping people choose the course of action that is morally correct (or perhaps just morally 
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best), because they are particular skills are all part of how one goes about making 
decisions on what course of action is morally appropriate. These functions are: to 
increase ethical sensitivity (which is “the ability to identify ethical problems in context”; 
to increase ethical knowledge; and to improve ethical judgment (which means improving 
“the ability to design an acceptable course of action for the ethical problem identified” 
thereby translating “knowledge into an (appropriate) plan” (Davis “Professional Ethics”). 
Davis also considers and rejects the potential objective: to increase ethical commitment, 
which involves “increasing the relative frequency with which students turn ethical plans 
into acceptable professional conduct” (“Professional Ethics”)3. 
 Also contributing to Davis’ thesis that moral theory is not the best way to teach 
professional ethics is his position that professional ethics is itself different from regular 
moral theory. Basically, professional ethics involves “special, morally permissible 
standards of conduct” that apply to all and only members of a given profession simply in 
virtue of the fact that they are members of that profession” (Davis “Professional Ethics”). 
As such, “professional ethics” is not only different from regular ethics, but it can also be 
quite varied depending on the professional ethics of different professions (so, for 
example, nursing ethics will be different from engineering ethics, which will be different 
from teaching ethics, and so on). Because of this peculiarity of professional ethics, Davis 
points out that “It is the special preserve of those who know how to practice the 
                                                 
3
 Davis gives three reasons for rejecting this objective (essentially that academic testing 
of ethical commitment is either ineffective or impractical, and that the true measure of 
ethical commitment occurs after graduation at which time there are too many intervening 
factors to accurately test whether or not the classroom learning objective of increasing 
ethical commitment was actually achieved (Davis in progress). 
  26 
profession in question or who have at least studied that practice in depth” (“Professional 
Ethics”), rather than ethics in the more ordinary sense of morality or moral theory. 
 Given Davis’ focus on the “professional” component in professional ethics 
coupled with his adopted learning objectives focusing on helping students learn how to 
choose the correct course of action in a morally problematic situation, Davis ultimately 
decides that what really needs to be taught in professional ethics is the following: 
Given that the objective of teaching professional ethics is to give students 
the appropriate sensitivity, knowledge, and judgment, a course in 
professional ethics should, it seems, include: 1) teaching students to 
recognize ethical problems that members of the profession typically 
encounter; 2) teaching students about the context in which they must 
address those problems (typical employer practices, the profession’s 
organization, the profession’s social functions, and so on), the special 
standards that members of the profession should consider when trying to 
develop reasonable solutions to those problems, ways to develop 
reasonable solutions (a decision procedure), and arguments that might be 
used to defend those solutions; and 3) giving students opportunities to 
practice judgment by explaining realistic ethics problems typical of their 
profession, resolving them, and defending their resolution. (“Professional 
Ethics”) 
In this sense, the context presented in a professional ethics course should largely 
introduce students to the ethics they will come across in their own professional practice 
(Davis “Professional Ethics”). 
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 Regardless of whether we accept Davis’ narrowed as now interpretation of the 
appropriate role of ethics in professional ethics (as opposed to moral theory), Davis has 
three arguments for why he believes that any course about professional ethics is 
ultimately better without moral theory than it would be with it. The first two arguments 
are practical arguments about the issues of who is teaching and about who is learning in 
the course in professional ethics. For the first argument, according to Davis, we can 
distinguish between three different types of instructors who might be called upon to teach 
professional ethics: moral experts or qualified moral theorists, self-taught (amateurs with 
minimal training or knowledge), and those in-between (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory 
in Practical Ethics” 70-1). Moral experts are those instructors who know enough moral 
theory to adequately and appropriately teach utilitarianism and RP theory (or, if another 
moral theory is selected, that particular theory). Since these instructors are qualified to 
teach the given moral theory or theories, presumably Davis would not take issue with 
them teaching moral theory (except, perhaps, on the grounds of his second or third 
argument). What Davis does seem to take issue with is the idea that instructors at the 
second or third level – for which we have some empirical evidence to believe represent 
the majority of professional ethics instructors (McGraw et al) – can teach moral theory 
sufficiently and/or accurately. 
 For the instructors who are self-taught, Davis illustrates his perception of the 
deficiency of their ability by way of suggesting that an example text they might use 
(Harris’ own Engineering Ethics) could not prepare instructors to teach the theories 
themselves, but rather just a few rules (similar to some Davis proposes in his alternative) 
(“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 71). For the instructors who are 
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in-betweeners (typically those who have had a class in moral theory or some relevant 
training in moral theory), Davis admits that they will likely be more capable of teaching 
moral theory than the self-taught instructors; however, he questions whether we have 
good reason to think they will get the moral theory right (“The Usefulness of Moral 
Theory in Practical Ethics” 71). More pointedly, Davis suggest that non-moral experts 
who know a little moral theory have a tendency to get part – or all – of a given moral 
theory wrong, or at best have a more shallow, incomplete understanding of it (“The 
Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 71). So, the argument seems to go, 
lacking instructors who are truly qualified to teach moral theory, we should not try to 
have moral theory be taught in professional ethics. 
 While the first practical argument focuses on who is teaching, the second 
argument focuses on who is learning. For this argument, Davis questions how much 
moral theory students are able to learn even if they have a qualified moral theorist or 
expert as their instructor (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 72). 
Since Davis is himself qualified to teach moral theory as an expert, he uses his 
experiences teaching moral theory – both in moral theory courses and in business or 
professional/practical ethics courses – as an estimate for typical student learning (or, 
perhaps more accurately, reception to learning); the results are less than sanguine. More 
alarming, given his experiences as a truly qualified instructor, he questions what we can 
expect from “ordinary instructors” – those who are self-taught or have minimal moral 
training (Davis “The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 72). 
 Davis’ third (and to my mind strongest) argument is that given the goals and 
objectives of teaching professional ethics, there is a simpler, more effective alternative 
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than trying to teach moral theory. According to Davis, instructors of professional ethics 
should teach something along the lines of his list of tests (“The Usefulness of Moral 
Theory in Practical Ethics” 73-4), which he believes does “pretty much everything 
teaching moral theory is supposed to do in a practical ethics course or for a practitioner 
with a problem but at lower cost in time and effort” (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in 
Practical Ethics” 74). Davis’ list of tests includes the following:  
1. Harm test – does this option do less harm than any alternative? 
2. Publicity test – would I want my choice of this option published in the 
newspaper? 
3. Defensibility test – could I defend my choice of this option before a 
Congressional committee, a committee of my peers, or my parents? 
4. Reversibility test – would I still think the choice of this option good if 
I were one of those adversely affected by it? 
5. Virtue test – what would I become if I choose this option often? 
6. Professional test – what might my profession’s ethics committee say 
about this option? 
7. Colleague test – what do my colleagues say when I describe my 
problem and suggest this option as my solution? 
8. Organization test – what does the organization’s ethics officer or 
legal counsel say about this? (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in 
Practical Ethics” 73-4) 
While Davis’ list is not going to be able to fulfill many of the moral theory functions 
posed by Harris and Gert – it’s not unifying morality under a single concept, providing 
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particular insight into the nature of morality, etc. – it does arguably fulfill the necessary 
theoretical functions that contribute to what Davis says are the objectives of teaching 
professional ethics.  
Moreover, Davis believes his tests have additional advantages. The main 
advantages Davis attributes to his list are seen as a direct result of the more “common 
sense” nature of his the list. Since the list is more intuitively plausible to students than 
“moral theory,” the supposed results are a decrease in student resistance, a decrease in the 
time it takes to present to students (because there is no need for an elaborate defense), a 
decrease in how long it would take for students to apply the moral tests “with reasonable 
accuracy,” and a decrease in the need for instructor training or moral experts (since one 
need not be a philosopher to learn the tests and teach them (Davis “The Usefulness of 
Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 74). Davis also presents as an apparent advantage the 
fact that his tests don’t hold the implicit claim that they are “correct” and alternatives are 
wrong or inadequate in the same way as do most moral theories (“The Usefulness of 
Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 75)4. Perhaps the main advantage of Davis’ list, 
though, is that it seems to more clearly fulfill the specific objectives for teaching 
professional ethics posed by Davis without adding to those objectives “extraneous” 
matter more fitting when teaching moral theory more generally; in this way, his list better 
meets with the “moral” goals in teaching professional ethics. 
 In the end, Davis believes he has good reason for discounting moral theory in a 
professional ethics setting, and instead showing preference for a more practical non-
moral-theory set of moral tests: not only does this approach best fulfill his more refined 
                                                 
4
 Although perhaps not so much moral theories as Harris or Gert present them. 
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conception of the goals and objectives in teaching professional ethics, but it also does not 
fall victim to two of his main arguments against the use of moral theory in teaching 
professional ethics, namely that most teachers are poorly suited to teach it (adequately 
and appropriately) and most students of professional ethics are poorly suited (or 
motivated) to learn it. Moreover, his approach has several practical advantages that using 
moral theory purportedly does not, such as decreases in how long it takes for teachers to 
teach ethics and for students to learn it, and improvement in student receptivity to the 
material and an instructor’s ability to master it and instruct others about it. Because of 
these many practical advantages, Davis believes we should do away with teaching moral 
theory in a professional ethics course and opt for a simpler (and to his mind better) way 
without theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE VIEWS APPLIED 
 
The Case 
 
In order to get a better idea of how each of these three views – Harris’ use of moral 
theory (utilitarianism and RP theory), Gert’s common morality, and Davis’ non-theory 
moral tests – play out in practical application, it is a useful exercise to run them through 
(it least in preliminary form) the same case study to see how they each function and what 
results derive from their use. The focus of this exercise is less on what specific 
conclusion each of these views reaches with respect to the specific case, but more on the 
process it takes to reach that conclusion. The hops is that by looking more in depth at the 
process we can get a better idea of what the students of professional ethics using that 
approach will experience and learn, as well as get some insight into what it might take for 
an instructor of professional ethics to teach that approach. 
Since Harris’ use of moral theory really requires a case where there is a 
utilitarianism/RP conflict, I selected a case where this conflict was present. Additionally, 
since part of Davis’ critique of Harris was that his example cases were not strictly 
professional ethics and hence not likely to come up in a professional ethics class (Davis 
“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Teaching” 53-4), I selected a discussion case that is 
offered by the National Academy of Engineering as a professional ethics case that can 
come up in engineering practice and be used in class discussion. The specific case I 
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selected was “Responsibility for Public Safety and the Obligation of Client 
Confidentiality (adapted from NSPE Case No. 90-5),” and is as follows: 
Tenants in an apartment building sue the owners of the building in order to 
force them to repair a number of annoying, but not dangerous, problems. 
The owners' attorney hires Duchane, a structural engineer, to inspect the 
building and testify on behalf of the owner. 
In the course of his inspection, Duchane discovers serious 
structural problems in the building, which are an immediate threat to the 
tenants' safety. These problems, however, are not mentioned in the tenants' 
suit. 
What should Duchane do? Should Duchane report the information 
to the attorney? To the owner? To the tenants? 
Suppose Duchane reports this information to the attorney, who 
tells Duchane to keep this information confidential because it could affect 
the lawsuit. 
What should Duchane do now? 
Is there a way to resolve the problem without compromising either 
Duchane's professional responsibility for the public safety or his 
obligation to preserve client confidentiality? (“Responsibility”) 
Because of how the case is presented, the basic decision a student would have is: Should 
Duchane keep the information confidential or not? 
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Harris 
 
The first thing to do with this case using Harris’ approach would be to make sure that 
using high-level moral theory is necessary. Harris takes “as a maxim of practical ethics 
that only lower-level principles or considerations should be employed if they are 
sufficient to satisfactorily deal with the issue at hand” (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 62). 
However, according to Harris these lower-level principles really only work if there is an 
obvious case of moral permissibility/impermissibility (like when an action is clearly a 
case of theft, etc.); since we are dealing with a case where there is a conflict of interests 
and values and no clear-cut answer, we need to analyze the situation using higher-level 
theories, namely utilitarianism and RP theory. 
 While an extended exploration into what each of these theories would consider to 
be the best course of action may involve a great deal of nuance in using several tests 
(such as doing cost benefit analysis and comparing act and rules utilitarianism for 
utilitarianism, and applying the Golden Rule or trying to determine where and which 
rights may be being infringed or violated (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 54)), I take it 
that the general thrust of the analysis – at least insofar as it is a utilitarian/RP theory 
conflict – is going to hinge on the conflict between promoting general human welfare 
(here, the tenants) and protecting persons from having their moral agency violated (here, 
the owners, and maybe also the hiring attorney) (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful” 57). A 
more sophisticated utilitarian analysis might weigh in the harms and benefits to the 
owners, attorney, and engineer as well (e.g. What harms will the owners have in terms of 
cost if Duchane tells versus the benefits if he stays silent? What harms might Duchane 
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incur professionally if he tells or does not? Will he lose potential future business if he 
tells, but run the risk of harming his standing with other engineers if he does not? Might 
not telling have long-term harms with respect to public trust of engineers if the truth 
about the building is discovered later? Etc.) Similarly, a more sophisticated RP analysis 
might look at more than the confidentiality violation (What respect does the engineer owe 
to the tenants? To the attorney? Does he have some obligation to himself or to the 
profession that might be violated depending on his choice? etc.) 
 After considering these sorts of questions, students will either find that the 
conclusions offered by utilitarianism and RP theory converge (in which case they can 
have greater confidence in that conclusion than if they had only met it with one of the 
theories), or they will find that the conclusions diverge. In the case of the latter, students 
can supposedly still find the process of using these moral theories enriching because they 
are better able to recognize the structure of this fundamental conflict that can happen in 
professional ethics, namely the conflict between promoting general human welfare and 
protecting the moral agency of individual persons. Additionally, after being exposed to 
the sort of utilitarianism/RP theory conflict as exists in this case, they will be able to 
anticipate it showing up in other similar cases of professional ethics. Students will also 
benefit from the richer understanding they get from moral theory in how to do moral 
analysis, as well as be able to use their knowledge of these two moral theories to critique 
available courses of action. 
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Gert 
 
The first thing to do with this case using Gert’s approach would be to look at his list of 
ten moral rules (p. 15 above) and see which ones are going to potentially be violated 
depending on which decision Duchane might make. Because Duchane has professional 
duties in virtue of being an engineer, he is going to need to consider rule #10: Do your 
duty. If there are any explicit laws related to the situation, he must look to rule #9: Obey 
the law. If he has made a promise (explicit or implicit) to either the building owners or 
the attorney, he will need to consider rule #7: Keep your promise. If he might be called 
on as to the condition of the building and either lies or stays silent (which might be 
considered a lie by omission), he will need to consider rule #6: Do not deceive. If telling 
the tenants means financial harm to the owners, he may also have to keep in mind rule 
#5: Don’t deprive of pleasure. Also, depending on the degree of structural damage and 
the risks that damage poses to the residents, he might need to consider rules 1-3 (Don’t 
kill; Don’t cause pain; and Don’t disable) as well. 
 After amassing the rules involved, students will then need to determine what the 
morally relevant features of the case are by following Gert’s list of ten questions (pp. 15-
6 above). This will first involve listing the rules potentially being violated (1-3 and 5-10). 
Next, they need to consider the harms being avoided, promoted, and caused with each 
decision (so staying silent might cause or promote harm to the tenants by avoid financial 
harm to the building owners; not staying silent will likely harm the building owners and 
possibly the attorney, but perhaps help the tenants avoid harm). The next two questions 
for teasing out morally relevant features involve ascertaining the relevant desires and the 
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relevant rational beliefs of those individuals toward whom the rules are being violated 
(e.g. the building owners’ desire to win the lawsuit and save their money, the tenants’ 
desire safer living accommodations, Duchane’s desire to do the right thing, the attorney’s 
desire that Duchane stay quiet; etc.). 
 Students also need to consider whether Duchane might have a unique duty to 
violate the moral rules given his professional role, and see if there will be any goods 
being promoted with either decision (e.g. the good of the attorney and clients winning the 
lawsuit and earning/saving money versus the good of the tenants winning the lawsuit and 
receiving better housing and/or compensation, etc.). They will need to consider whether 
there is an unjustified or weakly justified violation of a moral rule either being prevented 
or punished, and whether the given situation is “sufficiently rare that no person is likely 
to plan or prepare for being in it” (Gert “Morality” 18) (which does not seem to be the 
case here, because if this sort of conflict is common enough then a reasonable person 
should be prepared for it). Finally, they need to determine if the violation is “being done 
intentionally, knowingly, voluntarily, freely, or negligently” (Gert “Morality” 18). 
 After working through the many morally relevant features at hand, the next step is 
for each of the potential rule violations to ask the question: Would a rational, impartial, 
fully informed person publicly advocate this violation given the effects that will likely 
follow? This includes considering the seriousness, likely duration, probability of 
occurrence, and overall distribution of all of the goods and harms involved. At the end of 
this process each individual student should be able to determine what looks to be the 
appropriate course of action based on their own analysis, but their conclusions may end 
up differing from the conclusions that other students will end up with. Even if different, 
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however, students are meant to take comfort in knowing that irresolvable disagreement 
on what Duchane ought to do in this case is a real possibility and that they can have this 
disagreement without any ill effect on their own moral integrity. 
 
Davis 
 
Applying Davis’ plan to the given case does not involve multiple steps in the same way 
that the other two plans do; what it involves is working through Davis’ eight tests to see 
what the results of these tests combined say about the morally appropriate course of 
action. For the first test (the harm test), students would consider which course of action 
does the least harm (or if there might be third option that does even less harm). 
Presumably they would consider harms to all parties involved, perhaps even considering 
degree and distribution, then try to determine which choice results in less harm. For the 
second test (the publicity test), students ask “Would I (or Duchane, in this case) want that 
choice published in a newspaper?” Public opinion being what it is, I suspect these test 
leads to the choice of finding a way to inform the tenants rather than remaining silent. For 
the third test (the defensibility test), students ask which choice could be defended to a 
committee of peers or to one’s parents. The fourth test (the reversibility test) has us ask 
“what would I think if I was one of the people adversely affected by this choice?” (so as 
Duchane we would ask what it would be like to be the building owners and attorney if he 
tells, and the tenants if he keeps silent). 
 For the fifth test (the virtue test), students would ask what they would become if 
they choose that course of action often (so if Duchane makes a habit of either divulging 
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client information (even for the sake of safety) or if he makes a habit of maintaining 
client information (even with the risk of harm to others) what does that decision say 
about who he is as a person?). The sixth test (the professional test) has students ask what 
a particular professional ethics committee would way about a choice (so the question 
becomes what would a professional ethics committee in engineering say Duchane should 
do (or should’ve done)?). The final two tests (the colleague test and the organization test) 
involve actually consulting one or more colleagues and the organizational rules or ethics 
counsel to determine what they have to say on the subject. So the suggestions we take 
from these tests are that Duchane should talk the situation over with an engineering 
colleague as well as any organizational ethics counsel. 
 Davis makes it clear that he does not expect any one of these tests to determine 
the correct course of action (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Teaching” 56); each 
test is simply meant to bring out various aspects each option has that might have 
otherwise been overlooked. Then, if one course of action (e.g. Duchane keeping silent) 
passes all eight tests, then it is in all likelihood a good choice on what to do, and vice 
versa. Things are arguably more difficult when an option passes some tests but not all of 
them, and especially difficult if there is basically an even mix (passing four and failing 
four); there is no included scale with the tests to help students decide which one(s) should 
take precedence when there is divergence (although I suspect the tests 6-8 might carry 
more weight). However, students can perhaps feel more confident in their decision-
making because they have used four theoretical “screens” to catch the morally relevant 
considerations (Davis “The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 75). 
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CHAPTER 6 
BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER 
 
Relevant Features and Benefits 
 
Having examined in some detail the three competing views (Harris, Gert and Davis) and 
seen in preliminary form how all three would likely play out in dealing with an actual 
professional ethics scenario in the classroom, we are in a good position to engage a 
broader comparison of these views. The idea here is not only to get an idea of how the 
views stack up against one another (e.g. which view has a feature or proposed benefit that 
the others do not), but to also see which view or views has/have the sort of features and 
benefits that are most appropriate in the context of professional ethics and a professional 
ethics course. 
 To make this comparison easier, I have constructed a table [Table 1: Comparison 
of Features/Proposed Benefits of the Three Views] that compares these three views on 
whether or not they have a given feature or proposed benefit. The list of features and 
benefits was selected primarily from what each of the authors (Harris, Gert and Davis) 
presents as benefits or advantages to his respective view. I also included what Harris and 
Gert present as features of a moral theory, since they both showed a preference for their 
own views at least in part because their views presumably best fit the requirements of a 
moral theory, thus implying that these features are benefits or advantages; since Davis 
does not consider being a moral theory an advantage, his proposed goals of a moral 
theory were not included on the list. I then looked at each view to see whether it had the   
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Table 1: Comparison of Features/Proposed Benefits of the Three Views 
Feature/ Benefit Harris Gert Davis 
Able to unify much of morality and 
moral judgments under a single idea 
maybe yes maybe 
Able to offer insight into the nature and 
purpose of morality 
yes yes no 
Able to justify morality and its 
variations 
no yes no 
Able to help users analyze and resolve 
moral issues 
yes yes yes 
Able to explain different types of moral 
categorization (e.g. permissible, 
impermissible, obligatory, 
supererogatory) 
yes yes no 
Able to explain how morality relates to 
social practices and institutions 
no yes maybe 
Able to explain irresolvable moral 
disagreement 
no yes no 
Able to offer a high degree of 
confidence in a course of action when 
the results of multiples tests converge 
yes no yes 
Able to help users recognize the nature 
of fundamental conflicts in moral 
controversies 
yes maybe  maybe 
Able to help users anticipate the nature 
and character of future moral conflicts 
yes maybe maybe 
Able to provide a richer knowledge of 
the conceptual and technical 
underpinnings of moral analysis 
yes maybe maybe 
Able to provide an enhanced ability to 
critique opposing views 
yes maybe yes 
Has a basis in common sense no yes yes 
Explains all of common morality no yes no 
Allows users to maintain moral integrity 
in the face of irresolvable moral 
disagreement 
maybe yes no 
Able to be taught with minimal student 
resistance 
maybe maybe yes 
Able to be taught quickly maybe maybe yes 
Easy for those with limited experience 
in ethics to use 
no no yes 
Does not require moral expertise in 
order to teach well 
no maybe yes 
Has no implicit claim to being the one 
correct theory 
maybe no yes 
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feature or benefit, and categorized the results as ‘yes” (meaning the view or theory 
definitely has that feature), ‘no’ (meaning the view or theory definitely does not have the 
theory), and ‘maybe’ (meaning it’s not clear if the view or theory might have the feature, 
or meaning that the answer is reasonably open to interpretation). Except for two of the 
features, I basically accepted the authors’ claim that his theory or view had a particular 
feature or benefit (and where I question the purported benefit and say ‘maybe’ it’s 
because I think there is good reason). The table illustrates the results, but I will discuss 
them in a bit more detail below. 
 Able to unify much of morality and moral judgments under a single idea. Since 
his view is presumed to capture the whole of common morality under one general idea or 
moral theory, Gert’s theory arguably fulfills this particular function (Gert “Morality” 
2011). For Harris, while neither utilitarianism nor RP theory captures the whole of 
morality, he does believe they each capture a lot (or at least appear to), so for his view I 
said ‘maybe.’ For Davis’ view I also said ‘maybe’ because even though he is not trying to 
necessarily unify all of moral theory under a single idea, his list of tests do actually 
capture a lot of morally relevant features from multiple moral theories, so is at least 
unifying in that sense. 
Able to offer insight into the nature and purpose of morality. Both Harris and Gert 
claim that their view have this feature (Harris “Is Moral Theory Useful”; Gert 
“Morality”; Gert “The Usefulness”), but since Davis’ view only has moral tests 
independent of any moral theory, the latter does not appear to offer much, if any, insight. 
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Able to justify morality and its variations. Only Gert claims to be able to do this 
with his view (“Morality” 8), and indeed seems to be the only one who considers this to 
be a requirement of moral theory. 
Able to help users analyze and resolve moral issues. All three views are able to do 
this, although with varying degrees of difficulty. 
 Able to explain different types of moral categorization (e.g. permissible, 
impermissible, obligatory, supererogatory). Only Gert appears to present this as a 
requirement for a moral theory (“Morality” 9), but Harris’ view presumably would be 
able to do the same. For Harris, moral reasoning at level two can achieve this (“Is Moral 
Theory Useful” 53), and since moral reason at level four is higher and can presumably do 
everything the lower-level theories do and more, it follows that his level four theories 
(utilitarianism and RP theory) can do this as well. 
Able to explain how morality relates to social practices and institutions. Only 
Gert states this as a featured requirement for moral theory (“Morality” 9), but with Davis’ 
emphasis on understanding professional roles his view might fulfill this requirement as 
well. The main question with Davis’ view would be how much it really explains about 
the morality that is relating to the professional duties. 
Able to explain irresolvable moral disagreement. Gert is the only one who claims 
to be able to do this, or that this is an important feature for a moral theory to have (“The 
Usefulness” 31). However, all three admit of some degree of moral pluralism, so even if 
Harris and Davis do not try to explain irresolvable moral disagreement, their views 
presumably would allow for it. 
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Able to offer a high degree of confidence in a course of action when the results of 
multiples tests converge. Both Harris’ view and Davis’ view are able to do this, Harris’ 
when both utilitarianism and RP theory converge on a conclusion and Davis’ when 
several of his eight tests converge on a conclusion. Since Gert’s view does not have 
multiple moral tests like these two, his view is not able to do this (nor would he expect it 
to). 
Able to help users recognize the nature of fundamental conflicts in moral 
controversies. Harris is the only one who claims this as an advantage (“Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 62), based on the idea that most fundamental conflicts in moral controversies are 
of a utilitarianism/RP theory sort. However, it is possible that both Gert and Davis can do 
this to an extent with their views as well. With Gert, the process and practice of teasing 
out morally relevant features using his questions will likely over time help users see 
patterns in the types of conflicts they come across. Similarly, with Davis the practice of 
using his tests over time will possibly help students see that certain features and conflicts 
are more common. 
Able to help users anticipate the nature and character of future moral conflicts. 
Harris is again the only one who claims this as an advantage (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 
62), but as argued in Chapter 2 the ability to anticipate the nature and character of future 
moral conflicts seems to follow from the ability to recognize the nature of fundamental 
conflicts in moral controversies, so insofar as Gert and Davis are able to do the former 
they should also be able to do the latter. 
Able to provide a richer knowledge of the conceptual and technical underpinnings 
of moral analysis. Harris presents this as a major benefit to using high level moral 
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theories (“Is Moral Theory Useful” 64-5; “Response” 82), so his view should definitely 
have this particular feature. Again, however, insofar as students and practitioners are able 
to engage the conceptual and technical underpinnings of moral analysis by going through 
the process of moral analysis, Gert’s view and Davis’ view would arguably achieve this 
benefit as well. 
Able to provide an enhanced ability to critique opposing views. Harris also 
presents this as a major benefit to using high level moral theories (“Is Moral Theory 
Useful” 64-5; “Response” 82), so his view should definitely have this particular feature. 
However, Davis also appears to present this as something his view does, and indeed 
professional ethics ought to be able to do (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in 
Teaching”; “Professional Ethics”). Since Gert’s view concedes the existence of moral 
conflicts for which there is no resolution possible, it’s not clear how well his view is able 
to do this; it seems like if two people go through his whole moral reasoning process and 
end up with different views, there really are no grounds for critique. He does, however, 
claim that full explication of common morality can help practitioners defend their 
respective views and critique others (Gert “The Usefulness” 37), so it may be possible. 
Has a basis in common sense. Both Gert and Davis claim their views have this 
feature, but since Harris is defending high-level moral theories like utilitarianism and RP 
theory, his view really is not based on common sense. 
Explains all of common morality. Only Gert’s theory of common morality is able 
to achieve this feat. 
Allows users to maintain moral integrity in the face of irresolvable moral 
disagreement. Gert is again the only one who appears to consider this feature a benefit 
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(although he presents it as a major one (“The Usefulness” 31)). However, Harris’ view 
might have a similar advantage if this irresolvable moral disagreement is of a 
utilitarianism/RP theory sort and students have developed an appreciation for the 
fundamental nature of this sort of conflict. Davis’ view does not appear to do this, and 
indeed it seems he would disagree that this feature would even be a benefit (“The 
Usefulness of Moral Theory in Teaching” 57). 
Able to be taught with minimal student resistance. Davis is the only one who 
explicitly claims this benefit to his view (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical 
Ethics” 74), and is arguably the only one whose view has this feature (since Davis 
attempts to highlight resistance to both moral theory and the use of Gert’s common 
morality (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics”; “The Usefulness of 
Moral Theory in Teaching”). But this is really an empirical question and in need of 
further evidence to truly establish what degrees of student resistance are present with 
each of the respective approaches. 
Able to be taught quickly. Davis believes that his moral tests would be the 
quickest to teach (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 74), but Harris 
does make the argument that his view can be taught just as quickly (“Response”). Gert’s 
common morality, however, requires many steps and procedures and would seemingly 
take quite a bit of time for students and practitioners to get it right (insofar as this is 
possible). But, Gert’s view contains many heuristics that can potentially help speed up 
the process, so we may again have what is a truly empirical question. 
Easy for those with limited experience in ethics to use. Davis presents this feature 
as a key benefit of his view (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics”), 
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while it is doubtful that moral novices could jump in with utilitarianism, RP theory, or 
common morality and use them with particular reliability in the beginning. 
Does not require moral expertise in order to teach well. As Davis argues, we have 
reason to suspect that Harris’ theories require moral expertise to be taught well (“The 
Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics”). Gert appears to think that, since his 
common morality is drawn largely from common sense that it also does not require moral 
expertise (“The Usefulness”); however, having seen in the previous chapter (5) how his 
method actually applies to a professional ethics case I am suspicious that a lay ethicist 
would be unlikely to get the process right without some serious training or practice. In the 
end, Davis’ view seems like the only one with this feature. 
Has no implicit claim to being the one correct theory. Only Davis openly states 
that his view has this (or that it is a benefit) (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in 
Practical Ethics” 75). Gert maintains that his common morality is the one correct 
morality, so his view does not have this feature. Since Harris grants that neither 
utilitarianism nor RP theory fully capture morality, he may in some ways believe that 
there is not just one correct theory. But since he openly prefers these two views over, e.g., 
virtue ethics, there is an implicit claim to views being more correct. 
 
The Possibility of Consensus in Professional Ethics 
 
Since none of the three approaches is able to encompass all of the above features, the 
question that presents itself – the question that should determine which approach to 
teaching professional ethics is likely best – becomes a question of which features on the 
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list really matter; if we can figure out which feature(s) we must have (or perhaps some we 
absolutely do not want), then we can start narrowing down our options. This, however, 
appears to be the likely point of impasse between Harris, Gert and Davis. If, for example, 
Gert stands firm that being able to explain irresolvable moral disagreement and/or 
explicate all of common morality is a necessary part of professional ethics training, 
neither Harris’ nor Davis’ approach will ever suffice. Similarly, if Harris maintains that 
helping users recognize the nature of fundamental conflicts in moral controversies, 
anticipate these sorts of conflicts, obtain a richer knowledge of the conceptual and 
technical underpinnings of moral analysis, etc., are all key values for both students and 
practitioners of professional ethics, then even insofar as Gert’s or Davis’ views might be 
able to do these, they will always be a pale comparison to Harris’ own approach and so 
hardly any reason for him to abandon ship. Finally, if Davis’ key concerns when it comes 
to teaching professional ethics are the practical concerns like what can be taught quickly, 
with limited instructor training or student resistance, and minimum time required before 
students can start “doing ethics” reasonably well on their own, then neither Harris’ nor 
Gert’s approach can come close to his own in meeting these needs. Consequently, we 
have a theoretical Mexican standoff, where none of the parties is likely to shoot first and 
lose their ground. 
 So what now? If real consensus appears to be impossible, is there a reasonable 
middle ground? One idea would be to take Davis’ tests (or something similar) and bolster 
them with information on the theoretical underpinnings of the moral tests (whether these 
underpinnings are in terms of moral theories a bit like Harris perceives them or grounded 
in Gert’s common morality). As Harris and Gert point out, there are potential benefits to 
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students having this sort of enriched understanding, so it seems like this would take the 
best of both worlds. The results, presumably, would be an eminently practical set of tests 
and heuristics that are relatively easy for teachers to teach and for students to learn 
combined with a deeper ethical knowledge that would help students grasp some of the 
greater nuances of these tests, recognize the theoretical underpinnings that make these 
tests reliable tools in ethical decision-making, and help them position themselves in a 
much broader moral landscape than they would have with the tests alone. 
 However, there is a question as to whether or not students of professional ethics 
actually need this deeper ethical knowledge. According to Davis, not only do students not 
need it, they also do not want it (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 
75). While this attitude may in fact be a quirk of the student population with which he 
interacts, it is plausible that many (if not most) professionals and professionals-in-training 
do actually just want the fastest and simplest way to approach a given moral problem; 
maybe all they really want is just enough ethics training to make sure that they choose a 
course of action that ensures that they are not going to be held legally, financially, or 
professionally liable for having done something “wrong.”  
But presumably the goals of teaching ethics to (future) professionals run deeper 
than that. Or, at least, they ought to. Even though Davis argues that instructors of 
professional ethics ought to focus on more practical/professional application of ethics 
when it comes to teaching (such as recognizing typical ethical problems within the 
profession and the professional context in which to address these problems, and 
practicing the “special standards” individuals in this profession should consider and apply 
in engaging these problems (“Professional Ethics”), he does include more aspirational 
  50 
moral questions in his tests (such as “What would I become if I choose this option 
often?” (“The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics” 73-4). As such, it seems 
like even he wants (however implicitly) students to get at some of the deeper ethics issues 
at play.  
Moreover, if the specific pedagogical goals of teaching ethics in any particular 
professional program go beyond these sorts of bare-minimum objectives Davis puts 
forward (e.g. any goal wanting some theoretical understanding in addition to practical 
application), it is not clear that simply handing students a set of tests and teaching them 
how to use them will be able to achieve these particular goals. However well thought-out 
the tests, however much ethical underpinnings are behind the tests but left unstated, and 
however reliably students can apply them, in the end tests alone are highly unlikely to 
offer students the same degree of insight, knowledge and understanding into the nature of 
the moral issues and problems that they encounter as they would get with some degree of 
moral theory. Additionally, without this degree of insight, etc., it seems unlikely that they 
can develop a broader understanding and appreciation of the broader moral landscape in 
which these individual moral issues and problems arise. 
But what about the practical concerns of teaching moral theory in a professional 
ethics course? As we already saw in Chapter 4, Davis argues that moral theory does not 
belong in such a course in part because of the perceived facts that most instructors of 
professional ethics are not qualified to teach moral theory (or teach it well), and most 
students of professional ethics struggle to learn (or even be motivated to learn) moral 
theory as well. While it may be the case that Davis’ observations leading to his 
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conclusions are correct (although surely they would not hold true at every college or 
university) we still have reasons to doubt his conclusions. 
First, with respect to Davis’ argument against the qualifications of who is 
teaching, there is reason to think Davis is being rather uncharitable to Harris and 
Engineering Ethics, which is part of Harris’ reply to the argument (Harris “Response”). 
Likewise, with respect to Davis’ argument about student learning of and reception to 
moral theory, Harris responds with some good points on what also might explain the 
apparent student resistance (namely an issue with “theory” more so than with “ethics” 
(“Response” 85)). However, I believe the better response to Davis’ arguments is that 
there are entirely different, and to my mind more appropriate, conclusions we can draw 
from the apparent problems with who is teaching professional ethics and how well 
students are reacting to being taught professional ethics than the ones Davis draws 
himself. 
For the first argument: assuming that there is in fact a dearth of qualified 
instructors who are able to adequately and appropriately teach moral theory to students of 
professional ethics, this does not prove that moral theory does not belong in the 
professional ethics curriculum; it just as easily suggests that what we need to have is 
better instructor training in moral theory, or more hires of instructors who are already 
moral experts. To substitute another field for moral theory: I find it hard to imagine that a 
chemical engineering department lacking an instructor qualified to teach fluid dynamics 
would simply excise the material from the curriculum; surely, given the importance of 
fluid dynamics to chemical engineering, they would instead hire someone who is 
qualified or train someone already there so that they can become qualified.  
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 Similarly, for the second: granting that students of professional ethics resist and/or 
struggle with learning moral theory does not prove that we should not teach them moral 
theory; it can merely be suggestive of student resistance to learning theory (or learning 
generally). For example, I imagine that a large number of (thoroughly qualified) biology 
instructors teaching introductory or lower-level biology courses experience similar blank 
stares as Davis and at least have some population of students who resist and/or struggle 
with the “theory” of evolution. However, this does not mean that instructors and biology 
departments should shrug their collective shoulders and declare “So much the worse for 
evolutionary theory”; because they believe there is good reason for students to know 
about evolutionary theory, the latter is taught, student resistance notwithstanding. 
The basic idea here is that what should be driving the argument is whether or not 
the information at hand (whether fluid dynamics or evolutionary theory or moral theory) 
is important enough to the given curriculum (or the program at large) to warrant its being 
taught. If so, then we need qualified instructors, period, and the presence or absence of 
qualified instructors should have no bearing on the material’s perceived worth. Likewise, 
if we decide independently of student proclivities that moral theory is something that 
should be taught in professional or practical ethics, then the fact that students seem to 
turn into weeping angels when we mention Mill or Kant (or Aristotle or Gert) should not 
dissuade us from sticking with the “correct” curriculum. As such, what we really should 
be looking for is whether or not moral theory is the “correct” curriculum (which it may 
not be), and that determination seems like one that should be made based on the 
pedagogical goals of a professional ethics course rather than potential instructor and/or 
student failings. 
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Bringing It Back to Science 
 
So what does all of this tell us about what we should do in science? First, it should tell us 
to look at the proposed goals of teaching RCR (and perhaps ethics more generally) in 
science. While the overt goal of RCR training is to have there be less instances of 
scientific and/or research misconduct, there are some more specific learning objectives 
designed to get at this overarching goal. As a representative example, consider the 
following list of RCR learning objectives proposed by NIH: 
 increase knowledge of, and sensitivity to, issues surrounding the 
responsible conduct of research 
 improve their ability to make ethical and legal choices in the face of 
conflicts involving scientific research 
 develop an appreciation for the range of accepted scientific practices 
for conducting research  
 learn about the regulations, policies, statutes, and guidelines that 
govern the conduct of PHS-funded research 
 develop positive attitudes toward life-long learning in matters 
involving the responsible conduct of research. (“Why”) 
Understanding the policies and practices of scientific research and practicing making 
ethical choices given these policies and practices are quite similar to Davis’ main 
objectives for teaching professional ethics. But what about the other two? What does it 
mean for students to “increase knowledge of, and sensitivity to, issues surrounding the 
responsible conduct of research” and “develop positive attitudes toward life-long learning 
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in matters involving the responsible conduct of research”? Can we reasonably expect 
student to achieve these goals with the sort of tests or heuristics Davis offers without any 
accompanying moral theory? 
 Another good list to look at comes from the National Academies of Science and 
Engineering Workshop on Ethics Education and Scientific and Engineering Research. As 
part of the findings of this workshop, participants identified nine “required skills” that 
should be part of any scientific/engineering/research ethics education as follows: 
 Recognizing and defining ethical issues. 
 Identifying relevant stakeholders and socio-technical systems. 
 Collecting relevant data about the stakeholders and systems. 
 Understanding relevant stakeholder perspectives. 
 Identifying value conflicts. 
 Constructing viable alternative courses of action or solutions and 
identifying constraints. 
 Assessing alternatives in terms of consequences, public defensibility, 
institutional barriers, etc. 
 Engaging in reasoned dialogue or negotiations. 
 Revising options, plans, or actions. (Hollander and Arenberg 12-3) 
As with the previous list, much of this one looks like it can be fulfilled by moral tests 
without any corresponding moral theory. However, how much moral insight and 
knowledge is required in order to appropriately recognize and define ethical issues? Are 
the positions of all of the relevant stakeholders captured by Davis’ list (and, moreover, 
can you understand their respective perspectives from using tests alone)? And what is 
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entailed in identifying value conflicts? One of the main benefits to a moral theory 
approach like Harris’ is that it is supposed to explicitly help students recognize the nature 
and character of fundamental moral (and value) conflicts; but as we saw earlier in this 
chapter, it is not clear that Davis’ approach can really do the same. In addition to 
identifying value conflicts, what about truly understanding values? How are students 
expected to develop an understanding of the moral values that support science – like 
honesty, fairness, collegiality, openness, trust, etc (Committee 2-3, 48) – without being 
taught something about the theoretical moral underpinnings to these values (or is it 
enough that they can simply name them)? 
 The point here is that right now ethics in science, even when focusing primarily 
on RCR, is stating objectives that appear to need moral theory in order for them to be 
(fully) achieved. Or at least the rival approach that focuses on moral tests rather than 
moral theory looks like it can at best get us only part way towards achieving these 
objectives. Given this setup, it looks like we have two options. First, we can eliminate 
and/or modify some of the proposed objectives of ethics education in science so that 
moral theory is clearly no longer required (and opt instead for something like Davis’ 
moral tests). This would presumably carry with it the many benefits Davis’ tests purport 
to have, like being quick and easy to teach, minimize teacher training and student 
resistance, etc. It would also arguably be able to provide for a sort of shallow insight into 
the nature of moral reasoning and moral problems as they exist in science and research, 
and would still fulfill the more practical application ethics objectives there. 
 However, the question we need to ask ourselves is: Is this sort of shallow insight 
enough? If the answer is no, and if we want to keep all of the above ethics objectives 
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proposed, however, it looks like at least some degree of moral theory needs to start 
making its way into the science ethics curriculum. While in this thesis we only looked in-
depth at two approaches that might fulfill these needs, there are going to be other 
approaches to including moral theory that can probably serve science’s needs equally 
well. So what science needs to decide – or what her mortal, corporeal, earthly 
representatives need to decide – is how much and what sort of ethics education she really 
needs. Additional questions should be empirically, like which approach to teaching ethics 
is actually faster or easier or confronts less student resistance or is the sort of thing that 
helps students grapple with moral conflicts more reliably. But these, really, are the sorts 
of questions that should probably be secondary; the primary concern should be figuring 
out what real purpose ethics education is supposed to serve in science. But since that 
figuring is the sort of thing that hinges on the perceived weight and worth of particular 
values, we may need a little moral theory to even get started 
  57 
REFERENCES 
“Chapter IV - Grantee Standards.” National Science Foundation: Where Adventure 
Begins. The National Science Foundation. January 2010. Web. Spring 2014 
<http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf10_1/aag_4.jsp#IVB>. 
 
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy. On Being a Scientist: A Guide to 
Responsible Conduct in Research, Third Edition. Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press, 2009. Print. 
 
Davis, Michael. “Professional Ethics Without Moral Theory: A Practical Guide for the 
Perplexed Non-Philosopher.” (in progress, Draft August 14: 2013). 
 
Davis, Michael. “The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics: A Question of 
Comparative Cost (A Response to Harris),” Teaching Ethics Fall 2009: 69-77. 
Print. 
 
Davis, Michael. “The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Teaching Practical Ethics: A Reply 
to Gert and Harris,” Teaching Ethics Fall 2011: 51-60. Print. 
 
Gert, Bernard. “Morality, Moral Theory, and Applied and Professional Ethics,” 
Professional Ethics 1 (1992): 5-24. Print. 
 
Gert, Bernard. “The Usefulness of a Comprehensive Systematic Moral Theory,” 
Teaching Ethics Fall 2011: 25-38. Print. 
 
Hare, R. M. “Morality, Moral Theory, and Applied and Professional Ethics: Reply to 
Bernard Gert,” Professional Ethics 1 (1992): 25-30. Print. 
 
Harris, C. E. “A Reply to Bernard Gert,” Teaching Ethics Fall 2011: 39-46. Print. 
 
Harris, C. E. “Is Moral Theory Useful in Practical Ethics?” Teaching Ethics Fall 2009: 
51-67. Print. 
 
Harris, C. E. “Response to Michael Davis: The Cost is Minimal and Worth It,” Teaching 
Ethics Fall 2009: 79-86. Print. 
 
Hollander, R. and C. R. Arenberg (Eds.). Ethics Education and Scientific and 
Engineering Research: What’s Been Learned? What Should Be Done? 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009. Print. 
 
McGraw, David K., Daphyne Thomas-Saunders, Morgan Benton, Jeffrey Tang, and 
Amanda Biersecker. “Who Teaches Ethics? An Inquiry Into the Nature of Ethics 
as an Academic Discipline,” Teaching Ethics Fall 2012: 129-140. Print. 
 
  58 
"Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR)." National Science Foundation. N.p., 
n.d. Web. Summer 2014 < http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/rcr.jsp>. 
  
“Responsibility for Public Safety and the Obligation of Client Confidentiality 
(adapted from NSPE Case No. 90-5).” Online Ethics Center for Science and 
Engineering. National Academy of Engineering. n.d. Web. Summer 2014. 
<http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/ec90-5.aspx>. 
 
“Update on the Requirement for Instruction in the Responsible Conduct of Research.” 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). N.P., n.d. Web. Summer 2014. 
<http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-10-019.html>. 
 
“Why Is Instruction in the Responsible Conduct of Research Important?” National 
Institutes of Health (NIH). N.P., n.d. Web. Summer 2014. 
<http://sourcebook.od.nih.gov/ResEthicsCases/why.htm>. 
